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Even if we were not informed by other documents of Calvin's authorship of the pamphlet, each of its pages is too deeply marked with the imprint of the master to leave us in any doubt about the matter. In this eloquent vindication of the rights of persecuted innocence Calvin appears very noble and truly great. With his superior reason, his depth of insight, his unimpeachable logic—that powerful dialectic which forces home its argument—he transforms defense into attack, foresees objections and refutes them in advance, leaving the adversary no time to recover his footing. Without neglecting the facts which he discusses with an adeptness which masters of judicial eloquence might well envy him, he is constantly enforcing the plea: it is for the truth ignored that he contends, for the imprescribable rights of conscience. Arrived at this height, the personal question is effaced, or rather it is mingled with the great cause for the triumph of which the reformer has consecrated his life. Not that he forgets the interests of his client in order to urge his own ends. The defense of Jaques de Bourgogne—a model of precision, of method, of vigor, and of clearness—carries conviction into every unprejudiced mind . . . and in the presence of posterity makes the condemned of Malines the accuser of those who have prosecuted him. When addressing himself to Charles V the clever advocate neglects nothing which could appease a prejudiced and irritated judge. He does not forget, above all, that he speaks in the name of one who has remained a loyal and devoted subject notwithstanding the unjust severity he has suffered, yet the respect which he manifests toward the person of the emperor . . . does not diminish in the least degree the proud tone or the dignified bearing of the advocate.

It remains only to remind the reader that such a document reflects the age in which it was written, reveals conditions, social, intellectual, and personal, which are most illuminating.

The fact that there has long existed a good Latin translation of the original and the further fact that copies of an earlier edition of the French original are still accessible—though with difficulty—makes the value of this new edition lie chiefly in the greatly improved form in which it appears and in the increase in the supply of copies obtainable, thus making a hitherto rare work easily accessible to a greater number of readers.

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WARD'S REALM OF ENDS

These lectures¹ form a sequel to *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, likewise delivered as Gifford Lectures which, as the author says, might

¹ *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism*. (The Gifford Lectures, 1907-10.) By James Ward. New York: Putnam, 1911. xvi+490 pages. \$3.25.

well have been entitled the *Realm of Nature*. The primary title suggests at once the line of thought of Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze, while the secondary title brings before us the setting given to the problems of philosophy, most recently, in the contrasting statements of James and Royce.

These two contrasting points are of course as old as philosophy, for each has its basis in an aspect of experience. One seeks to develop the implications of the continuity and unity of experience—one world, one principle of thought, one supreme standard of right and goal of good. The other fixes attention upon the breaks, the spontaneity, the unique, the "new." It sees individuals, but is doubtful of a single whole.

Dr. Ward believes that we must start at least with this latter aspect. At the outset this world immediately confronts us not as one mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction. "The unity of the world . . . is an idea of our reason, not an object of our experience." The attempt to begin with the one has always failed. On the other hand, Dr. Ward holds that if we try to think things through we cannot rest in pluralism. "For pluralism, though empirically warranted, we find defective and unsatisfactory." Pluralism points to theism, "but the theism to which it points is only an ideal—an ideal, however, that, as both theoretically and practically rational, may claim our faith though it transcend our knowledge."

This conclusion is very familiar to the student of Kant, but there is little in the detail of the book to remind one of Kant. Aside from two lectures on Hegel of a historical character, designed to show that even his system starts with pluralism, the body of the work is a fresh examination of the problems presented by current discussions. Our historical setting, says the author, is this: In the nineteenth-century absolutism or singularism in some form predominated. Then the rapid advance of scientific knowledge brought naturalism or physical realism for a time to the fore. Now the insufficiency of realism is becoming apparent, and with it the necessity of interpreting nature in terms of mind. "But the recoil from absolutism still persists; and accordingly the twentieth century opens with the attempt to work out the idealistic interpretation not in the old way as essentially a devolution of the One, but rather—as far as possible—to represent it as an evolution of the Many" (p. 49).

Dr. Ward begins then with individuals "animated in various degrees,

and striving for self-preservation and self-betterment." Self-consciousness is our immediate experience, but this implies both a cognitive and a conative attitude toward a not-self. This immediate experience gives us the paradigm or pattern of an individual. An individual is not to be defined as something that cannot be divided without being destroyed, e.g., a clock. A true individual is rather a subject striving for self-preservation and self-betterment. In our dealing with persons we necessarily assume a multitude of such individuals. Some of these may be more developed than we, others less. The tendency is to view nature after the analogy of persons, physical laws as "inveterate habits." Instead of the physicist's "atoms" which are alike, the pluralist claims there is no evidence that any two beings are exactly alike. As contrasted with absolutism and realism alike, there are for pluralism no laws antecedent to the active individuals who compose the world, no laws determining *them*, unless we call their own nature a law, and then indeed the world would start with as many laws as there are individuals (p. 76). There is "contingency" and no rigid concatenation or fixed sequence. But as a necessary consequence of the interaction of individuals there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progression. Such progression we speak of as evolution. But evolution from this point of view is not the unfolding of any single plan, any more than it is the mechanical resultant of a composition of abstract units; it is a "creative synthesis." It is the origination of new properties in the whole which its constituents in their isolation did not possess. Whereas naturalism regards experience as the result of organization, pluralism regards organization as the result of experience. There is no fixed environment. Hence there is no fixed limit to progress. With growth of conscious social interaction comes the transition from subjectivity to objectivity of experience—knowledge and morality. Progress finally becomes a conscious ideal. Its goal is progressively higher forms of unity and co-operation. It might be expressed in the petition "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done." "But on the pluralist view the divine will would only be a reality as it was the ideal toward which the whole creation moves, attained at length."

So far pluralism. What are the defects which Dr. Ward finds in it? Not the defect of intrinsic absurdity which absolutists have affirmed. For if there is not at least the pluralism of self and not-self there is no ground for affirming anything. But there is a limit at each end of the process. The plurality of worlds leads the pluralist to assume individu-

als of a higher order, culminating in a highest, or in a society. But if our individuals are as absolute as we have supposed, our supreme spirit would be confronted and conditioned by free agents: a "finite God." And further, without some principle of the "conservation of value," some higher spiritual order, what ground have we to expect progress on the whole? At the lower limit, as we attempt to regress to an absolute origin, we seem only to get nearer to the indeterminate that affords no ground for distinct individuals. The process points beyond itself at both ends.

Has theism any advantage over pluralism? The theist maintains that beyond the universe of the Many there is a single transcendent experient who comprehends the whole. This offers a superior unity, and, what is more important, it affords an assurance that the pluralist's ideal will be attained. Its conception of creation is an attempt to maintain that the Many exist somehow in and through the One. Nevertheless it must be admitted that this "ideal without a place" cannot be demonstrated. Creation cannot be experienced. Nor can we regard it as an event at any finite point of time. Nor can it be conceived as an act of efficient causation. Can it be identified with evolution? Easily enough with the literal conception of evolution as the unfolding of a single plan. Not so obviously with the "creative synthesis" in which the Many become themselves creators. For this brings up under another guise the old theological conflict between determination and freedom. Naturalism and orthodox theology of the Jonathan Edwards type are here in league against the pluralist. But we insist here as before that without the creative activity of the self the very world as we know it would be impossible. Kant was right in maintaining the freedom of the self as practical. And this affords a more possible line of approach to the problem of evil. An evolution which admits of contingency and implies that knowledge and character are gained through experience seems to be the only sort compatible with moral good; and from such a world neither physical evil nor the possibility of moral evil can be excluded.

Two lectures are devoted to the question of a future life. While the position of Kant is taken that a future life is matter for faith rather than of knowledge, the "rational basis" of the faith is once more shown to be in the dual aspect of all our experience. "The gradual advance through impulse and desire to practical reason runs throughout it on all fours with the advance, through sensation, and imagination, to theoretical reason." In all progress we must be conative. It is not

merely a "wish" to believe; it is the active endeavor to move on where the issue cannot be demonstrated in advance. "As active beings striving for betterment we see that the way is not closed against us, and so we try to advance." "Faith is striving, and striving is faith." If man stands alone and if this life is all, the realization of the moral ideal is impossible. "Either the world is not rational or man does not stand alone and this life is not all."

The importance of Dr. Ward's book should be apparent from this brief outline of its method, although to appreciate its fairness of statement, its clearness in expression, its freedom from technicality, and its general "human" quality one must read it. In this field the recent contributions of greatest significance have been on the one hand that of Royce from the point of view of the One, and that of James and other pluralists from the side of the Many. But as many feel unable to accept the absolute by the former, because of the conviction that reason is proceeding too abstractly, so many feel that the "radical empiricism" of the latter errs by an equally one-sided depreciation of reason. Neither absolutist nor pluralist will accept Dr. Ward's method. For a thorough pluralist it is indeed an obvious inconsistency to ask what holds true at either limit of evolution, since this question would imply the applicability of present standards of thought to situations so different from that of the present thinker that we have no right to use them there. For a thorough monist, on the other hand, it will appear impossible to make any rational beginning at all with the assumptions of pluralism. The justification of the method must be tested largely by the success with which it maintains its central position of the twofold nature of experience, namely of the self as both conative and cognitive and as in both these aspects implying a not-self. The working-out of this principle is at times obscured by the large space given to criticism and exposition of other doctrines. But it seems probable that this is the line of greatest promise at the present time. It is the general method and very nearly the general conclusion of Kant, but the material examined is the material being disclosed by the scientific thought of today.

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PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Professor Carl Clemen, of the University of Bonn, is editing a series of publications, covering many phases of practical theology, which should be of great value to students of this subject. Dr. Clemen